Towards a Critical Race Methodology in Algorithmic Fairness by Hanna, Alex et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
03
59
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  8
 D
ec
 20
19
Towards a Critical Race Methodology in Algorithmic Fairness
Alex Hanna∗
Emily Denton∗
Andrew Smart
Jamila Smith-Loud
{alexhanna,dentone,andrewsmart,jsmithloud}@google.com
ABSTRACT
We examine the way race and racial categories are adopted in al-
gorithmic fairness frameworks. Current methodologies fail to ade-
quately account for the socially constructed nature of race, instead
adopting a conceptualization of race as a fixed attribute. Treating
race as an attribute, rather than a structural, institutional, and re-
lational phenomenon, can serve to minimize the structural aspects
of algorithmic unfairness. In this work, we focus on the history
of racial categories and turn to critical race theory and sociolog-
ical work on race and ethnicity to ground conceptualizations of
race for fairness research, drawing on lessons from public health,
biomedical research, and social survey research. We argue that al-
gorithmic fairness researchers need to take into account the mul-
tidimensionality of race, take seriously the processes of conceptu-
alizing and operationalizing race, focus on social processes which
produce racial inequality, and consider perspectives of those most
affected by sociotechnical systems.
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The problemdoes not endwith the collection of racial
data; it only begins. The problem accelerates when
we attempt to analyze these data statistically... The
racialization of data is an artifact of both the strug-
gles to preserve and to destroy racial stratification.
Before the data can be deracialized, we must deracial-
ize the social circumstances that have created racial
stratification.
– Tufuku Zuberi [125, pp. 102]
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the po-
tential for algorithmic systems to reproduce or amplify existing
social inequities. In response, the research field of algorithmic fair-
ness has emerged. This rapidly evolving research area is focused
on developing tools and techniques with aspirations tomake devel-
opment, use, and resulting impact of algorithmic systems conform
to various social and legal notions of fairness. The concept of fair-
ness, in addition to being situational, evolving, and contested from
a number of philosophical and legal traditions, can only be under-
stood in reference to the different social groups that constitute the
organization of society. Consequently, the vast majority of algo-
rithmic fairness frameworks are specified with reference to these
social groups, often requiring a formal encoding of the groups into
the dataset and/or algorithm.
However, most social groups relevant to fairness analysis re-
flect highly contextual and unstable social constructs. These social
groups are often defined with recourse to legal anti-discrimination
concepts such as "protected classes," which, in the US, refers to race,
color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or disability. However, the
process of drawing boundaries around distinct social groups for
fairness research is fraught; the construction of categories has a
long history of political struggle and legal argumentation.
Numerous recent works have highlighted the limitations of cur-
rent algorithmic fairness frameworks [53, 108]. Several of these
critiques point to the tendency to abstract away critical social and
historical contexts and minimize the structural conditions that un-
derpin problems of algorithmic unfairness. We build on this crit-
ical research, focusing specifically on the use of race and racial
categories within this field. IN this literature, the topic of the insta-
bility of racial categories has gone relative unexplored, with the
notable exception of Benthall and Haynes [12], which we discuss
in detail below.
Race is a major axis around which algorithmic allocation of re-
sources and representation is bound. It may indeed be the most sig-
nificant axis, given attention by investigative journalists (e.g. [7])
and critical race and technology scholars (e.g. [11, 20, 21, 24, 85]).
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Because of this, it is imperative that the race-based methodolo-
gies and racial categories themselves are interrogated and critically
evaluated.
In this paper we develop several lines of critique directed at the
treatment of race within algorithmic fairness methodologies. In
short, we observe that current methodologies fail to adequately ac-
count for the socially constructed nature of race, instead adopting a
conceptualization of race as a fixed attribute. This manifests in the
widespread use of racial categories as if they represent natural and
objective differences between groups. Treating race as an attribute,
rather than a structural, institutional, and relational phenomenon,
in turn serves to minimize the structural aspects of algorithmic
unfairness.
The process of operationalizing race is fundamentally a project
of racial classification and thus must be understood as a political
project, or, more specifically, what Omi andWinant [86] refer to as
a racial project. The tools for measuring individual characteristics,
such as national censuses and other population-level survey instru-
ments, were and are still often based in the politics of racial op-
pression and domination. While we acknowledge the importance
of measuring race for the purposes of understanding patterns of
differential performance or differentially adverse impact of algo-
rithmic systems, in this work, we emphasize that data collection
and annotation efforts must be grounded in the social and histor-
ical contexts of racial classification and racial category formation.
To oversimplify is to do violence, or even more, to re-inscribe vio-
lence on communities that already experience structural violence.
It is useful to distinguish between twoways in which race comes
into play in algorithmic fairness research: (i) the operationalization
of race, i.e. the process of converting the abstract concept of race
into something that is concrete and measurable and (ii) the use of
racial variables within algorithmic frameworks. These aspects are
tightly interconnected since race must be operationalized before
racial variables can be utilized.
Our contributions are as follows: we review the use of race in
prior fairness work and discuss an intervention in the debate on
racial categories. We then survey the history of racial classifica-
tion, scientific racism, and racial classification in national censuses.
We introduce the notion of multidimensionality of race, and subse-
quently review how different disciplines have dealt with the tricky
problem of operationalizing race, most notably in biomedical, sur-
vey, and public health research. In light of these discussions, we
address how race has been treated in the group fairness and dis-
aggregated analysis paradigms. Lastly, we argue that fairness re-
searchers need to take into account the multidimensionality of
race, take seriously the processes of conceptualizing and opera-
tionalizing race, focus on processes of racism, and consider per-
spectives of those most affected by sociotechnical systems.
2 THE PROBLEMWITH RACIAL
CATEGORIES
In perhaps the best-known debate surrounding algorithmic fair-
ness, Julia Angwin and her colleagues illustrated the differing rates
at which Black defendants had been issued high pre-trial risk as-
sessment scores by the COMPAS recidivism prediction algorithm
compared to white defendants [7]. Equivant – then, Northpointe,
the company which developed COMPAS – defended the system
by reanalyzing the ProPublica data [28] and ProPublica later re-
sponded [6]. The debate has become a cornerstone of algorithmic
fairness research; to date, the original story has some 700 citations
on Google Scholar.
The Propublica analysis of COMPAS, as well as the responses
fromNorthpointe and other secondary analyses performedby third-
party researchers, relied on data from the Broward County Sher-
iff’s Office which was obtained through a public records request.
Race classifications in this data identified defendants as Black,White,
Hispanic, Asian, Native American or Other. These categories look
familiar – they are nearly identical to the way that the US Census
defines race. However, there are the notable absences of the cate-
gories "Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander", and there is a
redefinition of "Hispanic" as a race rather than an ethnicity.
In the methodological appendix to the original article [69], Jeff
Larson and other ProPublica authors do not delve into how the race
of the defendant is measured. Larson admits that he did not know
how Broward County classified individuals 1. It’s not clear why
Broward County used the modified Census racial schema, but, as
detailed below, it may have to dowith a 1977 directive from the fed-
eral US Office of Management and Budget. In general, approaches
to measuring race for police records are inconsistent across mu-
nicipalities. They can rely on self-identification, state records, or
observation by criminal justice workers. In her work on racial dis-
parities in incarceration in Wisconsin, sociologist Pamela Oliver
notes that the race of a single individual can change across records
even within a single jurisdiction 2. Therefore, even in the most fa-
mous debate of the field, we don’t know why the data take on a
particular racial schema, nor do we have information about how
defendants are racially categorized.
2.1 Using race-like categories?
While an area of major concern for critical race and technology
scholarship, the use of racial categories in algorithmic fairness re-
search (i.e. the research community which has emerged around
venues like FAT* and AIES) has largely gone unquestioned. There
are two important exceptions. First, in the original Gender Shades
paper which helped establish intersectional testing, Buolamwini
and Gebru note the instability of race and ethnicity labels, which
justifies their use of skin tone [22]. Second, the critique levied by
computational social scientist Sebastian Benthall and critical race
scholar Bruce D. Haynes [12] describes how little attention has
been given to the meaning of protected class labels, the political
orientation of class labels, and the normative assumptions of ma-
chine learning design. They focus on the typical referent group –
African-Americans in the US – and discuss how "racial classifica-
tion is embedded in state institutions, and reinforced in civil so-
ciety in ways that are relevant to the design of machine learning
systems." Race is invoked because "racial classification signifies so-
cial, economic, and political inequities anchored in state and civic
institutional practices."
We wholly agree with their overall argument, which is that al-
gorithmic fairness research has been largely silent on the issues of
1Personal correspondence, Jeff Larson, August 19, 2019.
2Personal correspondence, Pamela Oliver, August 19, 2019.
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racial statistics and categories, and that in that silence, has thus rei-
fied them. In their criticism of the COMPAS debate, we echo their
argument:
rather than taking racial statistics... at face value, the
process that generates them and the process through
which they are interpreted should be analyzed with
the same rigor and skepticism as the recidivism pre-
diction algorithm. Thematically, we argue that racial
bias is far more likely to come fromhuman judgments
in data generation and interpretation than from an al-
gorithmicmodel, and that this has broad implications
for fairness in machine learning [12, pp. 291].
We diverge from their critique, not necessarily in their problem
formation, but in their solution. They offer up a narrow path to fol-
low which plots a course between the Scylla of "[m]achines that ...
[reify] racial categories that are inherent unfair" and the Charyb-
dis of "systems that allocate resources in ways that are blind to
race [which] will reproduce racial inequality in society" [12, pp.
294]. In their solution, they propose using an unsupervised ma-
chine learning method to create race-like categories which aim to
address "historical racial segregation with reproducing the politi-
cal construction of racial categories." One virtue of this method is
that it is attentive to creating a metric which makes sense with re-
spect to a particular social inequality, that is, spatial segregation.
This is something we agree with in our adoption of a multidimen-
sional perspective below.
We’d like to raise a few complexities in their formulation which
make us hesitant to adopt their solution. First, it would be a grave
error to supplant the existing categories of race with race-like cate-
gories inferred by unsupervised learning methods. Despite the risk
of reifying the socially constructed idea called race, race does exist
in the world, as a way of mental sorting, as a discourse which is
adopted, as a social thingwhich has both structural and ideological
components. In other words, although race is social constructed,
race still has power. To supplant race with race-like categories for
the purposes of measurement sidesteps the problem.
Second, supplanting racewith race-like categories depends highly
on context, namely how race operates within particular systems
of inequality and domination. Benthall and Haynes restrict their
analysis to that of spatial segregation, which is to be sure, an im-
portant and active research area and subject of significant policy
discussion (e.g. [76, 99]). However, that metric may appear illegi-
ble to analyses pertaining to other racialized institutions, such as
the criminal justice system, education, or employment (although
one can readily see their connections and interdependencies). The
way that race matters or pertains to particular types of structural
inequality depends on that context and requires its own modes of
operationalization.
Third, and relatedly, as Wendy Chun and Ruha Benjamin have
discussed [11, 24], race operates both with and as technology. At
the same time we focus on the ontological aspects of race (what is
race, how is it constituted and imagined in the world), it is neces-
sary to pay attention to what we do with race and measures which
may be interpreted as race. The creation of metrics and indicators
which are race-like will still be interpreted as race. As we discuss
more below, the example of genomics research is indicative. Even
as genomics researchers warn not to interpret genetic ancestry as
race or ethnicity [15, 122], this has not prevented people (e.g. cus-
tomers of direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies) from in-
terpreting them as such [98].
Finally, we’d like to underline the infrastructural criticism em-
bedded in the act of categorization itself. By infrastructure, we re-
fer to the way that classifications and standards form the infras-
tructure of our existing information society [17]. Inverting infras-
tructures and seeking their fissures allows us to understand how
they are used in practice and how politics are embedded in their
creation. This point dovetails with the critiques levied by abolition-
ist activists, scholars, and technologists [1, 9, 11]. J. Khadijah Abdu-
rahman [1] argues that to study algorithmic fairness is to sidestep
the problem beyond the algorithmic frame, that we, with commu-
nities who are disproportionally affected by redlining, predictive
policing, and surveillance, should not just contest how "protected
classes within algorithms are generated-but [should] viscerally re-
ject the notion human beings should be placed in cages in the first
place." The task of using racial classifications at all requires us to
expand the frame to consider what the larger implications of classi-
fying are. Who is doing the classifying? For what purpose are they
classifying and to what end?
3 HISTORIES OF RACIAL CATEGORIZATION
We recount histories of racial category construction by administra-
tive and scientific bodies as a means of highlighting the decidedly
social constructivist notion of race. As Hacking [48] has said, social
constructivism is the act of "making up people." Social construction
does not mean that things in the world are not "real" [31], but that
that thing – be it a racial, gender, or class category – was brought
into existence or shaped by historical events, social forces, politi-
cal power, and/or colonial conquest, all of which could have been
very different. When we demonstrate that something is socially
constructed, it becomes clear that it could be constructed differ-
ently, and then we can start to demand changes in it [48, pp. 6-7].
Race as a concept is widely acknowledged by the social sciences
to be a social construction. In the racial formation framework, Omi
and Winant [86] discuss how race is both real and socially con-
structed. The social constructedness of race decenters the concept
as a property of individuals determined by phenotypical proper-
ties. Instead, social constructivism places race within specific his-
tory and context. The constructedness of race in any given point in
time is tied to the specific racial project. A racial project is "simulta-
neously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial
identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute re-
sources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines"
[86, pp. 56]. Those racial projects can range in scale and kind, in
the microinteractional to the structural.
Race is not something that arrived whole cloth, but needed to
be made up. Race, although socially constructed, of course has
very salient material effects. Accordingly, the most modern under-
standing of race argues that it is inauthentic to conceptualize race
as a natural property of individuals. The "naturalization" of race
and racial categories do not come from nowhere. It has been con-
structed and been continually reproduced as part of a project of
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upholding a particular type of racial project – one that is histori-
cally and culturally bound. Historian Ibram X. Kendi, for instance,
thoroughly outlines the history of race and racial projects from 15-
century Europe to the present [64]. Projects that "misrecognize"
race as natural [27] are driven by the hegemonic nature of racial
projects [86]. It would be more accurate to describe race as rela-
tional and as a property of institutions, organizations, and larger
structures [93]. Race may be more accurately discussed as having
relational qualities, with dimensions that are symbolic or based on
phenotype, but that are also contingent on specific social and his-
torical contexts.
3.1 Classification and the Racial History of
Social Statistics
Classification is a process imbued with social, economic, and or-
ganizational imperatives [17, 38]. Those who do the categorizing
have their own institutional and occupational priorities. Categories
themselves become a type of infrastructure: they are the ground
uponwhich other structural and ideational elements are built.When
theywork, they are invisible, butwhen they break down, the bound-
aries and assumptions begin to show. With the development of
markets and the rise of technological innovation and actuarial sci-
ence, classification of individuals has moved from themore general
assessment based on subgroup distinction to individuation based
on market imperatives.
Although in the modern neoliberal era, markets have been an
emerging force in categorization and segmentation [39], the en-
tity tasked with categorization above all others has been the state.
Almost as soon as humans began living in agriculturally-based
communities, it became necessary to count the number of people
living under the control of a certain party [107]. Categorization
was also used to streamline counting items of like type – such as
trees in a forest, grain, or human beings. Further, since early grain-
based agriculture necessitated vast numbers of essentially slave-
laborers, rulers needed to know how many slaves there were and
moreover, who counted as a slave. As Scott argues, during the agri-
cultural revolution there was initially strong resistance to transi-
tioning from life as a hunter-gatherer to a more hierarchical, regi-
mented, and predictable existence as a slave harvesting grain and
to "being counted" by newly-created states [107].
The modern discipline of statistics grew out of a bureaucratic
need tomanage large populations and natural resources [52].More
specifically and perniciously, the field of social statistics emerged
from the need to make differentiations between white Europeans
and their descendants, and other peoples. Francis Galton was a ma-
jor figure in the development of social statistics; he was also a eu-
genicist and a major proponent of using statistics as a means to
justify racial superiority of European-origin peoples [16, 124, 125].
As Galton writes in his Hereditary Genius:
The natural ability of which this book mainly treats,
is such as a modern European possesses in a much
greater average share than men of the lower races.
There is nothing either in the history of domestic an-
imals or in that evolution tomake us doubt that a race
of sane men may be formed, who shall be as much su-
perior mentally and morally to the modern European
as the modern European is to the lowest of the Negro
races (quoted in [124]).
The practice of racial classification that emerged in social sta-
tistics is closely tied to the project of nation-building, in multiple
senses. In the first case, racial classification was a prerequisite to
the project of European colonization of the Americas. The racial-
ization of chattel slavery is a modern phenomenon. European colo-
nial projects developed alongside Enlightenment ideas of liberal
democracy. Creating structures of racial stratification necessitated
ideational components that would legitimate the enslavement of
Africans [125]. Until the early 20th century in the West and the
rise of cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas, there was wide-
spread support for eugenics and scientific racism, and the belief
that the state must intervene to protect the physical and mental
characteristics of the white race. In 1926, 23 of 48 states had laws
permitting sterilization [106]. At the height of miscegenation leg-
islation (that is, laws against marriages which were "interracial"
or "cross-cultural" in nature), 41 American colonies and states had
laws against the practice [88]. As the project of nation-building
(more specifically, colonization of non-European nations) waned in
the 1960s, so did the popularity of eugenics as a scientific practice.
However, as Syed Mustafa Ali notes, the scientific racism under-
girding colonialism has persisted as "‘sedimented’ ways of know-
ing and being – based on systems of categorisation, classification,
and taxonomisation and the ways that these aremanifested in prac-
tices, artefacts and technologies" [2]. Technologies of racial classi-
fication, such as blood quantum for Native Americans, persist and
upon legacies of settler colonialism. These technologies become
enshrined in folk understandings of racial percentages, such as ge-
netic ancestry [113], or in law, as blood quantum remains a legal
requisite to tribal membership, tribal constitution, and land claims.
Second, since the founding of the Americas, delineating racial
boundaries has been part and parcel of the state-building project.
Assessing and evaluating racial and ethnic boundaries is a state
practice that coincides not only with a cultural understanding of
who belongs to the polity, but has and continually is a prerequisite
for formal citizenship in many countries. In the pre-war United
States, appeals to citizenship for non-native born residents were
fundamentally appeals to whiteness. Lopez documents how ap-
peals to whiteness and the boundaries of the category of white-
ness flexed and contracted in legal argumentation [73]. The 1790
Naturalization Act restricted citizenship to "any alien, being a free
white person" who had been in the United States for at least two
years. It wasn’t until the passage of the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952 that the explicit racialized nature of naturalization
was restricted, although the Act laid the groundwork for the cur-
rent restrictive race-based ratio system which exists today. Magh-
bouleh demonstrates how, prior to 1952, Iranians could be used as
a "racial hinge" to argue both for and against claims to whiteness,
and how citizenship claims critically depended onwho couldmake
this claim [75].
Third, national censuses are a critical component of state ma-
chinery. State enumeration of populations works to facilitate the
administrative and bureaucratic functions of the modern nation-
state. As Scott points out:
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State simplifications such as maps, censuses, cadas-
tral lists, and standard units of measurement repre-
sent techniques for grasping a large and complex re-
ality; in order for officials to be able to comprehend
aspects of the ensemble, that complex reality must be
reduced to schematic categories. The only way to ac-
complish this is to reduce an infinite array of detail
to a set of categories that will facilitate summary de-
scriptions, comparisons, and aggregation. The inven-
tion, elaboration, and deployment of these abstrac-
tions represent, as Charles Tilly [116] has shown, an
enormous leap in state capacity – a move from trib-
ute and indirect rule to taxation and direct rule [106,
pp. 77].
Furthermore, censuses not only quantify members of racial so-
cial groups, but also create and constitute the boundaries of these
social groups themselves. Melissa Nobles outlines how racial classi-
fications are taken for granted by policymakers, but how national
censuses not only enumerate politymembers into racial categories,
but also help to reinscribe racial categories themselves, that is, "[c]ensus-
taking is one of the institutionalmechanisms bywhich racial bound-
aries are set" [112, pp. xi]. In the US, the national census is the
sole basis for which representation is guaranteed in the House of
Representatives and the Electoral College. In the antebellum US,
the Three-Fifths Compromise, in which Black slaves were counted
as three-fifths of a human for the purposes of appropriation and
taxation, is the most dramatic example of racial classification in
counting populations. Whereas the passage of the 14th Amend-
ment guaranteed all Americans being counted as a whole person
regardless of race, racial categories defined in the Census in the lat-
ter part of the 19th Century reflected fractional referents to Black
racial lineage based in the ascendant movement of eugenics and
race sciencementioned above. Categories of "octoroon" and "quadroon",
alongwith "mulatto" denoted fractional heredities of the Black pop-
ulation [112].
Because of the allocative nature of census-taking and the bu-
reaucracies associated with the practice, what goes into the cen-
sus is politically contested by mobilizing racial and ethnic groups.
The political contestation of the census has been laid bare recently
with the attempted introduction of a citizenship question into the
US Census and its potential for its dampening effects on participa-
tion by Latinx groups [72]. For instance, after the 1950 Census, in
light of the discoveries of dramatic undercounts of non-white pop-
ulations and with rising pressures from the Civil Rights Movement,
the 1960 Census shifting from interview identification to asking in-
dividuals to self-identify their race. As Snipp rightly points out, this
procedural change was a "fundamental redefinition of race." Popu-
lation statistics formerly based on phenotypical appearances were
now based on "cultural affiliation and other deeply held personal
considerations beyond the pale of conventional demographic in-
quiry" [112, pp. 570]. This shift was not only bureaucratic but also
(perhaps unknowingly by the Census Bureau) ontological: race as
measured by the Census aligned more with the social construc-
tionism and less with essentialism. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Directive No. 15 of 1977 instituted a standard in
racial classifications used by government agencies and developed a
standard for five distinct groups: (a) American Indians and Alaska
Natives, (b) Asian and Pacific Islanders, (c) Non-Hispanic Blacks,
(d) Non-Hispanic Whites, and (e) Hispanics. The impact of this di-
rective had far-reaching implications, as this categorization "per-
meated every level of government, many if not most large corpo-
rations, and many other institutions such as schools and nonprofit
organizations" ([87], cited in [112]). The 1997 revision of Directive
No. 15 separated out Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders,
set Hispanics and Latinos apart as an ethnic group (rather than
a racial group), and allowed respondents to provide multiple re-
sponses to racial heritage [112].
Dramatic changes in governance have large downstream effects
for the accuracy of census counts and their categories. Khalfani et
al. document the differences between the South African numbers
before and after the reign of Mandela’s African National Congress,
and find that the raw counts and the estimations from aerial pho-
tography both dramatically undercount the majority African pop-
ulations, as well as women [65]. The US Census Bureau spends a
non-trivial amount of effort getting enumeration correct formarginal-
ized groups; however, those efforts can be stymied with the winds
of partisanship and political administration. Even without the is-
sues raised by a potential citizenship question, decreased or flat-
lined funding has left the Census Bureau understaffed and unable
to thoroughly test new methodologies [32].
In sum, the act of classification cannot be divorced from the
group who is doing the classification and the organizational and
institutional pressures of performing classification. Racial classifi-
cation has a long history within quantitative social science, and, in
some ways, is the reason that social statistics have developed the
way they did. That history is grounded in eugenicist thought and
practice, and much of that work provided the infrastructure for
census-taking in the US, Canada, Latin America, and South Africa.
More expansive categorization resulted from social and political
movements in those countries. In short, categorization itself is a
technological infrastructure within which institutional racism con-
tinues to reside. In this way, we can realize the ways in which race
intersects with technology but also as a technology in and of itself.
The framing of race as technology shifts the terrain of the discus-
sion – rather, from what race is and how we can classify individu-
als, to what we can do with race and how to make it do different
(and explicitly anti-racist) things.
3.2 The multidimensionality of race
As highlighted by the 1960Census shift from ascribed to self-identification,
classification is largely contingent on the particular appraisal of
race used.Whenwe say "race", wemay be discussing self-identification,
but we also may be referring to phenotypical features or observed
assessments from third parties. Racial classifications are uneasily
balanced not only on the particular unstable equilibrium of racial
projects, but also on the micro-level processes of race appraisals
themselves. When it comes to measurement and operationaliza-
tion, "race" is not a single variable, but many differing and some-
times competing variables. Roth [95] refers to this constellation of
variables as the "multiple dimensions" of race. Race manifests in
many ways in the real world. Each of these different dimensions
can be measured in a different manner for empirical research, and
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each of these different dimensions have distinct downstream out-
comes. It may therefore be more appropriate to study a particu-
lar outcome using measurement which reflects a respective dimen-
sion of race. Table 1 reproduces, withminor amendments, the table
from [95] which outlines each of these dimensions.
Racial identity and racial self-classification refer to subjective
self-identification of race. In theory, self-identification is one di-
mension but in practice these two are measured in different ways
and have differing downstream outcomes. Racial identity can be
thought of as the sense of self, the identity and broad group with
which someone belongs. Accordingly, its measurement instrument
is that of an open-ended interviewer or survey question. Racial
self-classification refers to the discrete categories that one marks
on intake forms, census surveys, and self-identification documents
for employment. This dimension, as noted earlier, is highly con-
strained by the categories determined a priori by institutional and
organizational directives, such as OMB Directive No. 15.
Observed race refers to the race which others believe ascribed
to an individual. This may be based upon first impression by an
interviewer or annotator. The third-party can make an assessment
based solely on appearance or interaction. Appearance-based ob-
served race depends on readily observable characteristics, whereas
interaction-based observed race depends on language, accent, and
other physical, aural, or social cues. Reflected race is the racewhich
an individual believes that others ascribe to them. Although this is
a first-person evaluation, it is the first-person evaluation of a third-
party appraisal.
Phenotype refers to the set of objective characteristics which
characterize appearance. A significant literature revolves around
skin color appraisals as a means for determining particular social
outcomes (e.g. [82, 114]) and the use of skin color as a means of
evaluating facial recognition systems (e.g. [22, 92]). Other race-
related phenotypical features include hair texture and color, eye
shape and color, and lip shape. The related outcomes for phenotyp-
ical features are the same as those for observed race, but are not
constrained in measurement by discrete racial categorization3.
The dimensions of race noted here are, of course, unstable across
time, place, and context. Just as racial classifications themselves
are tied to particular racial projects, modes of self-identification,
observed race, and reflected race will be tied to the dynamics of
that project. Self-identification has been shown to be responsive to
one’s arrest records [89] and to one’s class position [115]. Observed
race depends on the interviewer or annotator who is doing the ob-
serving. Reflected race depends not only on phenotype but also on
the social status of the group in which the individual believes they
are being recognized as. These positions shift across time, not only
across the life course but also across the longue durée of different
racial projects.
Three major implications follow from the of multiple dimen-
sions paradigm. Thefirst is that theremay be inconsistencies across
different dimensions of race. A single individual can have differing
racial appraisals. In the health field, for instance, Roth cites several
3In a sense, the "observed race/appearance-based" dimension and the phenotype di-
mension are collapsed for computer vision systems, because a computer vision system
can only "see" the objective and phenotypical.
studies in which individual self-identification differs from medi-
cal records, interviewer classifications, or death certificates. Sec-
ond, the dimensions can cross the boundaries between each other.
Phenotype and reflected race can impact self-identification but do
not fully determine it. However, the third and most important im-
plication, also highlighted in Table 1, is that different dimensions
will be associated with differing outcomes. Therefore, using a mea-
surement of race which does not reflect social processes associated
with it may misrepresent the scope of racial disparities at best and
underreport them at worst.
4 LESSONS FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES
The variance in what the concept of race can mean has been noted
as "antithetical to the tenets of scientific research, which, in its
ideal form, demands that analytical variables be consistent and
their categories mutually exclusive" [70]. Yet, the social centrality
of race positions it as a critical concept in many fields of study. In
this section, we review how other disciplines, such as public health
research, biomedical research, and studies of social inequality, have
grappled with the use of racial categories within their disciplines.
We surface these discussions to understand how algorithmic fair-
ness research can learn from these methodological approaches.
4.1 Limitations in operationalizing race
Scholars from a range of disciplines have observed a widespread
lack of clarity around the use of racial variables within their respec-
tive fields. Race is often inconsistently conceptualized and mea-
sured across studies; definitions and processes of operationaliza-
tion tend to be insufficiently documented. These inconsistencies
pose serious challenges for the validity and utility of research re-
sults. For example, inconsistent categories and classification schemes
can result in mismatches between different measures of race for
the same individual across different time points or across studies.
This in turn can significantly impact health statistics [62, 101], pop-
ulation statistics [8, 74], and measures of social inequality [102].
Country-specific understandings of what "race" references and lo-
cal racial categorization schemes pose significant challenges for
international comparisons [96].
Standardizing racial taxonomies andmeasurement practices does
not sufficiently mitigate the many concerns scholars have raised
regarding the use of racial categories in scientific studies. In fact,
the widespread uncritical adoption of racial categories, standard-
ized or not, can erode awareness of the social and political his-
tories of racial taxonomies and reify racial categories as natural
kinds [19, 30, 42, 43, 78, 100, 111]. The reification of race as a nat-
ural category can in turn re-entrench systems of racial stratifica-
tion which give rise to real health and social inequalities between
different groups [62, 110]. The unquestioning use of racial cate-
gories in scientific research can also lead to misplaced conclusions.
For example, the use of race as a natural category can obfuscate
the environmental, social, and structural factors that contribute to
health disparities [29, 110] and lead to the racialization of certain
diseases [19, 30, 37]. The genomic era in particular has given rise
to new concerns regarding the use of race in technologies and re-
search. Race-based pharmaceuticals have been critiqued for their
part in reifying racial categories as markers of biological difference
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Dimension Description Typical Measurement Outcomes it may be appropriate
for studying
Racial identity Subjective self-identification, not
limited by pre-set options.
Open-ended self-identification
question
Political mobilization; assimi-
lation; social networks; voting;
residential decision-making;
attitudes
Racial Self-Classification The race you check on an official
form or survey with constrained
options (e.g. the Census)
Closed-ended survey question Demographic change; vital statis-
tics; disease and illness rates
Observed Race The race others believe you to be Interviewer classification Discrimination; socioeconomic
dispartiies; residential segregation;
criminal justice indicators; health
care/service provision
- Appearance-Based Observed race based on readily
observable characteristics
Interviewer classification with in-
structions to classify on first obser-
vation
Racial profiling; discrimination in
public settings
- Interaction-Based Observed race based on charac-
teristics revealed through inter-
action (e.g. language, accent, sur-
name)
Interview classification with in-
structions to classify after interac-
tion or survey
Workplace discrimination;
housing discrimination;
language/accent-based discrimina-
tion
Reflected Race The race you believe others as-
sume you to be
A question such as "What race do
most people think you are?"
Self-identification processes; per-
ceived discrimination
Phenotype Racial appearance Usually interviewer classification,
but also "objective" characteristics
such as: skin color; hair texture and
color; nose shape; lip shape; eye
color
Discrimination; socioeconomic
dispartiies; residential segregation;
criminal justice indicators; health
care/service provision
Table 1: Multiple dimensions of race. Reproduced and amended from [95]. Note that we have excluded "racial ancestry" from
this table. Genetics, biomedical researchers, and sociologists of science have criticized the use of "race" to describe genetic
ancestry within biomedical research [40, 49, 84, 122], while others have criticized the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing
and its implications for racial and ethnic identification [15, 91, 113].
[59, 63]. Genetic ancestry testing has been criticized for its poten-
tial to promote biological essentialilsm and reinforce race privilege
amongst those already experiencing it [15, 98]. Finally, bioinfor-
matics tools and research practices themselves contribute to the
essentialization of race [10, 42, 43, 51].
There has also been significant debate about the appropriate
use of racial variables in studies aimed at identifying causal ef-
fects [46, 54, 55, 58, 67]. Objections to the use of race as a causal
variable are often couched in terms of manipulability, embodied
by the slogan "no causation without manipulation" [54]. These
arguments often point to the physical impossibility of manipulat-
ing race, thus precluding its use as a causal variable. Several addi-
tional, more sociologically-grounded objections to the use of race
as a causal variable have emerged within social statistics [55], anti-
discrimination legal scholarship [67], and health research [46]. These
objections point to the fundamental role race plays in structuring
life experiences, making it nonsensical to talk about two individu-
als being identical, save for race. Stated another way, attempts to
isolate the treatment effect of race are often based on a "sociologi-
cally incoherent conception of what race references" [67].
Several scholars have pointed to the significant social conse-
quences that arise when race is misconstrued as a variable that
can produce causal effects [3, 46, 58, 124]. First, without proper
contextualization of results, there is a tendency to misattribute the
causal mechanisms of difference the racial categories themselves
[3, 46, 124], further reifying race as a natural category. Second,
misidentifying race, rather than racial stratification, as the root
cause of social and health disparities can lead to misplaced con-
clusions and ineffective public policy interventions [46].
4.2 Critical race methodologies
These critiques have given rise to a host of critical race method-
ologies informing the use of racial categories within these respec-
tive disciplines. To begin, the choice to use racial categories at all
should be carefully examined, particularly in biological contexts.
Despite widespread agreement that racial categories do not de-
scribe genetically distinct populations [84], genomics researchers
have grappled for over a decade with the utility and harm of using
racial categories to frame research studies and communicate scien-
tific results. The context of use is key to assessing the appropriate
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use of racial categories. For example, when adopted as a social or
political category, race has utility in genomics, e.g. to document
biological differences that result from processes of racial stratifi-
cation. However, when disconnected from their social and politi-
cal histories, racial categories have no place in biological research
[30, 90, 122]. Genetics, biomedical researchers, and sociologists of
science have emphasized the importance of distinguishing ances-
try from racial taxonomies within biomedical research [40, 49, 84]
and have warned against the dangers of of using racial categories
to describe genetic variation [14, 30, 122].
As noted above in our discussion of Benthall and Haynes, race
cannot and should not be done away with entirely. The key chal-
lenge here is to "denaturalize without dematerializing it" [78] by
recognizing race as a multidimensional, relational, and socially sit-
uated construct. This begins with centering the process of concep-
tualizing and operationalizing race, critically assessing the choice
of categories and measurement schemes, and fully articulating and
justifying these decisions in academic communications [46, 60, 71,
77, 83].
In the context of causal studies, several methodologies have been
proposed to mitigate the risks of reifying race as an entity that pro-
duces causal effects. For example, some researchers have consid-
ered studies that manipulate properties associated with race, such
as names [13] 4. Sen andWasow’s ’bundle of sticks’ framework the-
orizes race as a composite variable that can be disaggregated into
constitutive elements, some of which can be manipulated [109].
Epidemiological and public health researchers have increasingly
shifted their practices towards the study of social determinants of
health, and in particular, the multiple ways racism affects health
outcomes [41, 61, 71, 117, 119, 120]. This shift from studying ef-
fects of race to the effects of racism is a central component of
critical race methodologies emerging within other disciplines. For
instance, Ford and Hawara propose a methodology for the oper-
ationalization of race within health equity studies as a multidi-
mensional, context-specific variable with a relational component
to explicitly capture the effects of racial stratification on health
outcomes [34].
Moreover, appropriately contextualized descriptive studies can
be an important tool for identifying and understanding patterns
of inequality. When race is utilized as a descriptive category, the
choices about what categories to use and how to assign individuals
to categories significantly impacts the results of analysis [18, 102,
114, 115]. For example, Howell and Emerson compare the effec-
tiveness of five different operationalizations of race in predicting
different measures of social inequality. The study found each oper-
ationalization told a different story, pointing to the importance of
critically evaluating racial categories and measurement schemes,
as well as the importance of articulating these decisions in the com-
munication of results [56].
In recent years, anti-racist efforts have emerged within public
health thatmore thoroughly integrate critical race theory intomethod-
ologies and discourse [35, 36]. While earlier studies of the social
determinants of health tend to center individual and interpersonal
4However, Kohler-Hausmann has been critical of such "audit" studies for not being
able to isolate the treatment effect for race, although they do, in some circumstances,
"provide evidence of a constitutive claim that grounds a thick ethical evaluation" [67,
pp. 33-34]
racialized experiences, this new paradigm shifts focus to the in-
stitutional and structural conditions that shape racial disparities
in health [44, 45, 110, 118]. Anti-racist practice also emphasizes
the importance of researchers recognizing their privilege and posi-
tionality and the way this might shape their practice. For example,
the Public Health Critical Race Praxis offers a self-reflexive and
race-conscious research methodology that centers discourse and
practice around the perspectives of socially marginalized groups,
building on community-based participatory approaches [35].
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR USING RACE IN
ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS RESEARCH
We observe several widespread tendencies when using race within
algorithmic fairness research. First, frameworks for describing and
mitigating unfairness adopt a simplistic conceptualization of race
as a single dimensional variable that can take on a handful of val-
ues. This simplification erases the social, economic, and political
complexity of the racial categories. Further, methodologies built
upon this conceptualization of race tend to treat groups as inter-
changeable, obscuring the unique oppressions encountered by each
group. We argue that this framing limits the effectiveness of fair-
ness analysis and interventions and risks reifying racial categories
in the process.
Second, the process of conceptualizing and operationalizing race
for the purposes of studying or mitigating different aspects of algo-
rithmic fairness has – with the exceptions noted above – received
little attention. Moreover, racial categories are frequently adopted
with little attention given to the histories of the categories or suit-
ability of the categories for the fairness assessment.
We discuss the importance of focusing on categories and mea-
surement processes, and fully articulating these decisions in com-
munication of results. Lastly, we discuss the use of disaggregated
analysis and the implications for incorporating a more nuanced
understanding of measurement for these analyses.
5.1 Race and group fairness
Group fairness criteria represent a class of algorithmic fairness
definitions predicated on clearly defined subgroups in the dataset.
"Fairness" is obtained by equalizing a particular statistic, or set of
statistics, of the classifier across groups. Many different group fair-
ness criteria have been proposed. For example, demographic par-
ity requires equal rates of positive prediction [33] across groups.
Equality of odds [50], also referred to as equalized mistreatment
[123], requires equal false positive and false negative rates across
groups. Equal opportunity [50] restricts this requirement to only
a single value of the true outcome. Calibration (or test fairness)
[23, 66] requires the actual outcome to be independent of protected
attributes, conditioned on estimated outcome.
While limitations of group fairness criteria have been previously
explored [26, 47], here we focus our examination on the conceptu-
alization of race embedded within this framework. By abstracting
racial categories into a mathematically comparable form, group-
based fairness criteria deny the hierarchical nature and the social,
economic, and political complexity of the social groups under con-
sideration. Most notably, critical race theorists and Black feminist
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thinkers have criticized group fairness approaches for their under-
lying ideal, liberal approaches to ameliorating past harms.
Black feminist cultural geographer Katherine McKittrick, fol-
lowing Patricia Hill Collins, discusses how such approaches have
resulted in a ’flattened geography’ which obscures the unique op-
pressions encountered by Blackwomen, instead treating oppressed
social groups as interchangeable [25, 79]. Ladson-Billings and Tate,
in their critical race critique of liberal education paradigms, ex-
plain that the tension between and even among different racial
groups are not adequately examined or understood and assume
"that all difference is both analogous and equivalent" [68]. Politi-
cal philosopher Charles W. Mills notes that the liberal underpin-
nings of both theoretical and methodological approaches towards
equalization have historically tended to have significant detrimen-
tal consequences for racial minorities and only serves to advance
a white "racial contract" [80].
In short, group fairness approaches try to achieve sameness across
groupswithout regard for the difference between the groups. Group
fairness offers an incomplete version of what a race-conscious pol-
icy would be. This treats everyone the same from an algorithmic
perspective without acknowledging that people are not treated the
same. As political philosopher ElizabethAnderson notes, "[s]tandard
conceptions of distributive equality, embodied in ideas of equality
of opportunity... fail to consider how such opportunities build in
group hierarchy" [4].
5.2 Conceptualizing and operationalizing race
The question of how best to operationalize race for the purposes of
studying or mitigating different aspects of algorithmic unfairness
has received little attention. By discounting the considerations that
go into operationalizing race, the scope and effectiveness of subse-
quent analysis and interventions fail to interrogate how the partic-
ular operationalization and measurement affect a given outcome.
For instance, referring to Table 1, while observed racemay bemore
important for studying discrimination, self-identification may be
more suitable for studying identity formation and voting behavior.
We suggest centering the process of conceptualizing and opera-
tionalizing race when working with racial variables. In particular,
we urge algorithmic fairness researchers to critically evaluate exist-
ing racial schemas. Because of data limitations, we are most often
bound to the categories provided by census categories or other tax-
onomies which stem from bureaucratic processes. We know from
the histories outlined above that these categories are unstable, con-
tingent, and rooted in racial inequality.
Following recent work aroundmeasurement and fairness [5, 57],
we suggest taking seriously the problems of measurement model-
ing when considering racial variables. Race, like fairness, is itself
a contested concept, and it follows that adopting a multidimen-
sional view is one strategy forward for approaching this. Recently,
Roth has called more broadly for a "sociology of racial appraisals"
in which we better theorize how observed race has changed over
time, and how these changes influence norms of classification [97].
Given that most, if not all, of algorithmic fairness research is os-
tensibly concerned with anti-discrimination, this charge should be
taken seriously.
As a helpful analogue, a growing body of survey research has
highlighted the impact that racial category andmeasurement choices
can have on outcomes being measured [102–104]. Similarly, we
emphasize that the various choices that go into the operational-
ization of race for the purposes of fairness-informed analysis or
interventions significantly impact the result. Therefore, we need
to be transparent about definitions, categories, measurements, and
motivations for racial schema used in research and publication. If
possible, multiple measures of race should be collected. In addition,
measurement of race should be considered as an empirical problem
in its own right.
In domains where the categorization is based solely on observ-
able characteristics, e.g. image datasets are annotated by third-parties,
care needs to be taken to ensure race is not reduced to phenotype.
This consideration can inform how the subgroups themselves are
defined (e.g. shifting conceptually from racial categories to cate-
gories defined along phenotypic lines) and the way in which the
dataset and analysis results are communicated with the larger re-
search community (e.g. detailing procedures for determining cate-
gories and categorymembership, ensuring a distinction is made be-
tween phenotypically-determined categories and high-level racial
categories). In the context of disaggregated evaluations in com-
puter vision domains, the FAT* community has already seen amarked
shift towards defining groups based on phenotypic properties rather
than racial categories, thanks to the pioneeringwork of Buolamwini
and colleagues.
However, we also note that shifting to phenotypically-determined
categories does not provide a full-stop solution. Given the dark his-
tory of physiognomy and phrenology [121], in particular their role
in promoting scientific racism and eugenics, researchers should
be careful when imposing categories based on, for example, facial
landmarks (e.g. IBM’s diversity in faces dataset has labelled facial
dimensions, proportions, etc.). Doing so risks devolving into using
phenotypical features as inputs for a predictive models for individ-
ual characteristics and internal psychological states. Furthermore,
while phenotype can be used as ameans to understand processes of
discrimination, practitioners should not equate race to phenotype,
not to mention other biological markers such as genomes.
5.3 Disaggregated analysis
Frameworks for algorithmic audit studies [22, 92] and standard-
ized model reporting guidelines [81] have highlighted the impor-
tance of reportingmodel statistics disaggregated by groups defined
along cultural, demographic, or phenotypic lines. In contrast to
group fairness definitions, which are often employed as ideals to be
met, disaggregated analysis operates at a descriptive level. These
analyses should begin from a pragmatist understanding of differ-
ences and interrogate the most salient aspects of race to be con-
sidered for particular technologies. For instance, in their audits of
facial analysis technologies, Buolamwini and her colleagues con-
centrate on the phenotypical dimensions of race to understand the
disparities of these vision-based systems5. Results of disaggregated
analysis depend heavily on the choice of categories and racial mea-
surements used.
5It should be noted that they do not take a similar approach towards gender.
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Within survey research, sociologists of race have investigated
the utility of different racial categories for the purposes of under-
standing markers of social inequality. Howell and Emerson find
that a five-fold measure of self-identified race explains more varia-
tion inmeasures of inequality in income, housing, and health in the
US [56]. Saperstein and Penner find that racial categorization op-
erates both as an input and an output to racial inequality. Individ-
uals who experience an increase in social position (e.g. increased
income) may be more likely to "lighten" themselves in survey re-
sponses, while those who becomemore disadvantaged (e.g. experi-
encing unemployment or incarceration) may "darken" themselves
[89, 105]. The implication here is that it is necessary to understand
the way that a particular racial dimension manifests in measure-
ment and how it relates to the sociotechnical system under consid-
eration. We encourage algorithmic fairness researchers to explore
how different racial dimensions and their attendant measurements
might reveal different patterns of unfairness in sociotechnical sys-
tems.
5.4 Limits of the algorithmic frame
Before undertaking the project of systematizing social groups based
on race, we should begin by interrogating why race is a relevant
factor in the analysis of the system to begin with. Here, it is criti-
cal to expand the scope of analysis beyond the algorithmic frame
[108] and interrogate how patterns of racial oppression might be
embedded in the data and model andmight interact with the result-
ing system. We urge researchers to question the following: is de-
lineating data along racial lines critical to understanding patterns
of fairness produced or reproduced by the system?
In many cases, severe fairness concerns are evident prior to any
quantitative race-based analysis of the system’s outputs. For exam-
ple, Rashida Richardson and colleagues recently published an ex-
tensive survey of the "dirty data" used to develop predictive polic-
ing systems in the US [94]. The report reveals that in nine out
of the thirteen jurisdictions reviewed, predictive policing systems
ingested data that was generated while the jurisdiction was un-
der investigation for corrupt, racially-biased, or otherwise illegal
policing practices. This work represents an analysis centered not
around race but around racially disparate policing patterns. This
echoes much of the work from within health and biomedical sci-
ences which emphasizes a racism effect rather than a race effect.
5.5 Centering perspectives of marginalized
groups
Lastly, interventions in the vein of algorithmic fairness need to con-
sider the problems of the racially oppressed based on their view of
injustices. Political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson proposes that
we think about injustices fromwhat she calls a non-ideal standpoint
methodology [4]. The methodology is non-ideal insofar as that it
views injustices from the point of view of the aggrieved groups and
the particular harms these groups are facing. The methodology is
"standpoint"-based insofar as we should begin from the perspec-
tives of oppressed groups. Here, we can draw lessons from pub-
lic health scholars who prioritize community-based participatory
approaches. These methodologies, which are grounded in critical
race theory and feminist standpoint epistemology, take lived expe-
riences of marginalized groups as a valuable and essential source
of knowledge.
6 CONCLUSION
In this article, we have pulled back the frame from the algorithms
involved in algorithmic fairness themselves and focused on the cat-
egories which constitute the "protected classes" used within these
frameworks.We focus on race, given the critical nexus of race, tech-
nology, and inequality, and the prevalence of race in algorithmic
fairness scholarship. We traced the histories of classification, eu-
genics, and state-sponsored category creation, and warned of the
tendency to reify and naturalize racial categories which were the
product of long histories of inequality. We then noted the mul-
tidimensionality of race and considered lessons from disciplines
which have been dealing with this issue for decades. Lastly, we
review the algorithmic fairness literature in light of these consid-
erations. We highlight limitations of algorithmic fairness method-
ologies that adopt a simplistic and de-contextualized understand-
ing of race and outline several suggestions for algorithmic fairness
researchers moving forward.
Most in the FAT* community are what Ruha Benjamin calls the
"overserved" [11]. In this light, racial classifications need to be in-
terrogated from the perspective of who they serve. Who is doing
the categorizing and for what purpose? As in the beginning of
this article, we echo J. Khadijah Abdurahman, "it is not just that
classification systems are inaccurate or biased, it is who has the
power to classify, to determine the repercussions / policies asso-
ciated thereof and their relation to historical and accumulated in-
justice." Racial classifications can be an important tool in post-hoc
disaggregation analysis. However, we need to know how to dis-
aggregate, how to contextualize categories of disaggregation, and
who that categorization serves.
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